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DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN STATE LABOR LEGISLATION
By

FOWLIR VINCrNT HARPER*

PART TWO
IV
Statutes Relating to Conditions of Employntent
a. Safety and Health
State interference with conditions of employment, as determined
by the strength of the contracting parties, by imposing requirements
calculated to protect the safety and health of employes, has not been
without interruption from the courts. In the earlier cases, when
organized labor was not strong enough to enforce the most reasonable demands without assistance from the legislature, the courts were
wont to look with astute eye upon the infringement of liberty of
contract thus resulting. When the reasoning started with the assumption that liberty of contract was the rule and the employment of
the police power of the State the exception, a decision unfavorable
to labor invariably resulted. The conception of this liberty of contract as an absolute right with but few, if any, qualifications, provided a premise from which but one result could emanate. Any
logical deduction therefrom was inevitably bound to result in the
invalidation of statutes imposing health and safety requirements
upon those who employ labor. When, however, opinions started
with the qualified conception of liberty of contract with the police
power, not as the exception, but as the general principle applicable,
a weighing of interests usually resulted, which might or might not
produce a result sustaining the statute.
Sometimes the acts were invalidated, in these early days, upon
the grounds that both employer and employe were deprived of their
liberty or property, but for the most part, the employer being the
only one upon whom the expense of the measures fell, it was his
liberty which was made the grounds for solicitude. As in the matter
of hours of labor for employes, the courts apparently did not, at
*Professor of Law in the University of North Dakota.
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first, quite grasp the full significance of the issue presented. Thus
a Pennsylvania court, in sustaining a statute requiring mine owners
to provide for adequate ventilation, assumed that there was no doubt
whatever about the validity of the measure.'6 6 "If the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania," observed the court, "through her legislature can police our towns and villages, why may she not police the
coal mines within her borders? . . . If she recognizes, almost as a
part of her organic law, applicable to the property of her citizens,
the rule long ago grown into a maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, why may she not make it equally applicable to the lives of her
citizens ? ' 167 But employers were not slow to make legal capital
out of the liberty of contract notion. When Illinois, shortly after
the Pennsylvania case, enacted a statute requiring mine owners to
make or have made an accurate map of the workings of the mine,
those who employed men to toil therein insisted that this was so
unreasonable and so unfair that it deprived them of their property
without due process of law. The court, though approaching the
question cautiously, could fiind no great hardship imposed, and conIn both of these cases, the court
sequently sustained the act.16
must manifestly transcend
legislature
assumed the attitude that the
its province before its action would be interfered with by the judiciary. The burden, in other words, was upon the liberty of contract
advocates.
In 1885, the New York court invalidated an act prohibiting the
manufacture of cigars in tenement houses. 60 Liberty of contract
much impressed the judges. The police power problem was easily
70
disposed of by denying that the act was a health measure at allY.
"When a health law," it was declared, "is challenged in the courts
as unconstitutional on the ground that it arbitrarily interferes with
personal liberty and private property without due process of law,
the courts must be able to see that it has at least in fact some relation to the public health, that the public health is the end actually
166Williams v. Bosnell, 8 Phila. 534 (1873).
1671bid, 536.
' 6sDaniels v. Hilgard, 77 Ill. 640 (1875).
16 9Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98 (885).
2l°Ibid, 114.
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'17
aimed at and that it is appropriate and adapted to that end. '
The measure having no relation to a legitimate legislative objective,
there was consequently no public interest to be weighed against the
private interest, and consequently none was weighed.

When, however, the Supreme Court, in 1898, had committed
itself to the proposition that labor in underground mines was of such
great interest to the public that the legislatures could regulate the
length of time thereof, 172 the effect of Re Jacobs was of less significance. In 1902 Illinois requirements for the appointment of inspectors for mines, at the expense of the owners were sustained
by the Federal Court,

73

and five years later it was found by the

same high Court that liability might be imposed upon the owners
for the willful failure of managers to provide a reasonably safe place
74
for workmenY.
It was not long until the Arkansas "full crew"
act, requiring a certain number of trainmen for the operation of
freight trains, was upheld by the Court. 75 Thereafter, at frequent
intervals, the States constitutionally required entries of mines to
be of a specific width, 7 6 building machinery and hoisting equipment to be guarded against' 7

7

barrier pillars to be left of suitable

width between adjoining mines,' 78 owners of mines to furnish certain conveniences, such as washhouses, for miners, upon request by a
7
'-1
bid, 115.
172 Holden v. Hardy, supra (1898).
'73St. Louis Consolidated Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185 U. S. 203, 46 L. Ed.
872, 22

Sup. Ct. 616

(19o2).

174Wilmington Mining Co. v. Fulton, 205 U. S. 60, 51 L. Ed. 708, 27
Sup. Ct. 412 (1907). Cf. liability in maritime law of the vessel for tort
caused by negligence of a compulsory harbor pilot. The China, 7 Wall. 53,
I9 L. Ed. 67. But note the different rule of the common law, worked out on
the theory of principal and agent. Carruthers v. Sydebotham, 4 Maule & S.
77 (1815); Ramsdell Trans. Co. v. La Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,
182 U. S. 406, 45 L. Ed. 1155,

21

Sup. Ct. 831 (9O).

'7tChicago, R. I. & P. R. R. v. Arkansas, 229 U. S. 453, 55 L. Ed. 290,
3, Sup. Ct. 275 (191I), followed in St. Louis, I. M. & So. R. R. v. Arkansas,
240 U. S. 518, 6o L. Ed. 776, 36 Sup. Ct. 443 (1916), as to switching crews.
176 Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U. S. 26, 57 L. Ed. 1050, 33 Sup. Ct. 692 (1913).
'. 7Chicago Dock Co. v. Fraley, 228 U. S. 680, 57 L. Ed. 1022, 33 Sup. Ct.
715 (913).

' 78Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pa.,

359 (1914).

232

U. S. 531, 58 L. Ed. 713, 34 Sup. Ct.
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certain number of employes ;"" and an Indiana act providing for
safety devices on cars and coaches of railroad trains was invalidated
only because the Federal Safety Appliance Act had superseded the
State law. 80 A Texas requirement, however, that conductors on
passenger trains must have served two years as a conductor on a
freight train, but prescribing no other qualifications, was adjudged
insufficiently related to the public health to be within the police
power.'81 There were dissenting opinions, and it may or may not
be of significance that the liberty which suffered most was that of
trainmen seeking employment.
These later decisions are far removed from Re Jacobs. It is
noteworthy that the constitutionality of enactments of safety laws
on behalf of workmen was established by the Federal Supreme
Court. Labor interests, after Lochner v. New York, learned that
they could expect a liberal construction of statutes enacted for their
benefit from the Supreme Court although, as we have seen in part
and shall further see, State courts were striking blow after blow at
the development of the doctrine that the interest of society in the
relations between employer and employe was so great that the extent
of constitutional latitude for such legislation was indeed a broad one.
' 79 Booth v. Indiana, 237 U. S. 391, 59 L. Ed. IOli, 3"5 Sup. Ct. 617 (1915).
See also Princton Coal Co. v. Fettinger, 185 Ind. 675, 113 N.E. 236, 114 N.E.
4o6 (1916). In 1922 a similar statute of Kentucky was invalidated in the
State court, not because the employer was deprived of his property without
due process of. law, but because the act was to take effect upon the approval
of a body other than the General Assembly. Commonwealth v. Beaver Dam
Coal Co., 194 Ky. 34, 237 S.W. io86 (1922).
' 80 Southern .R R. v. R. R. Commissioner of Indiana, 236 U. S. 439, 59
L. Ed. 661, 35 Sup. Ct. 309 (1915). In People v. Harris, 74 Misc. 353, 134
N. Y. S. 4o9 (1911), an act was upheld which required doors in factories to
open outward, where practicable, and not be bolted or locked during working
hours. An Indiana Act, however, requiring coal mine operators to employ
a "sufficient" number of "shot firers" to inspect and fire all blasts, was unconstitutional. Glendale Coal Co. v. Douglas, 193 Ind. 73, 137 N. E. 615
(1922).

' 81Smith v. Texas, 233 U. S. 630, 58 L. Ed. 1129, 34 Sup. Ct. 681 (1914).
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b. Statutes Relating to Time and Method of Payment and
Amount of Wages
The method and time of payment of wages has been the battle
ground of many a bitter Constitutional contest in the courts. Early
in the history of the growth of social legislation, both the power
of the State to amend charters of corporations and the general police
power were resorted to for justification of statutes regulating this
phase of industrial activity. Both principles were met by the contention that the effect of such acts was to deny to those affected
the liberty of contract protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Different courses of decisions pricked out different paths and it was
only after a slow and checkered history that the proposition was
given serious consideration that only upon a basis of complete economic equality can freedom of contract be, in any sense, a reality.
Worn out and childish conceptions of liberty and naive notions of
freedom have left their mark on this, as well as other phases of labor
law, and while complete emancipation therefrom has not yet been
realized, it is at least less remote than it was a half century ago.
Courts at first were unable to understand what there could be in
the condition or situation of the laboring man in mines to disqualify
him from contracting in regard to the price or mode of determining
the price of his toil,"8 2 and consequently statutes which regulated the
same were null and void. It was the laborers' liberty, however, that
demanded protection. The courts would not countenance unconstitutional insults to his wisdom and sagacity. Thus an act which
prohibited payment in store orders was "an insulting attempt to put
the laborer under legislative tutelage," which was not only degrading
to his manhood, but "subversive of his rights as a citizen of the
United States."''
Any law which prohibited the laborer from selling his toil for what he thinks best was "an infringement of his constitutional privileges, and consequently vicious and void."'' 41 But
this, it must be obvious, is a patent perversion. "The only real right
at issue," said Professor Freund, "in the wage payment acts is that
282See Millett v. People, 117 Ill. 294, 302-303, 7 N.E. 631 (1886).
' 8 3See Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 431, 437, 6 AtI. 354 (x886).

'8 4Ibid, 437.
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of the employer, the right of the owner of the business to direct its
internal arrangements according to his own discretion."'' 11
But the courts were trying to bolster up what, at bottom, must
have been an ancient natural law argument. Inapplicable economic
maxims were dragged in to beg the question further. The natural
law of supply and demand was the best law of trade.'
This notion
was carried so far as to produce the invalidation of an act which did
no more than prohibit manufacturers from selling merchandise and
supplies to their employes at a greater percentage of profit than to
others,'87 for it was an "attempt to do for private citizens, under no
physical or mental disabilities, what they can best do for themselves."' 8 s The economic superiority of the one party to the contract over the other, was completely ignored by the courts in these
decisions, as a consideration to which they were not entitled to attribute legal significance.
So shy were the judges of basing a decision boldly upon the right
of the State to adjust economic inequalities under the police power,
that the most absurd reason could be employed to uphold such a
statute rather than the interest which the public might have in the
welfare of laborers. Thus the Indiana court pronounced constitutional a measure prohibiting employes from making contracts in advance to accept anything but lawful United States money in payment
for wages on the grounds that the government had sufficient interest
in preserving the integrity of its legal tender to justify such an interference with liberty of contract. 18 9 '"e
can not conceive," said the
court, "a case in which the assertion of the legislative power to regulate contracts has a sounder foundation than it has in this instance."' 90 But most cases could not be determined even on such
flimsy grounds, and liberty of contract was upheld at the expense
of acts imposing fines for the withholding of any part of the wages
of an employe engaged in weaving, for imperfections that might arise
in the work,,191 acts prohibiting mine owners and manufacturers
185 "Constitutional Labor Legislation," 4 Ill.

L.Rev. 6o9, 616 (igio).
' 86
See State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 184, 10 S.E. 285 (1889).
87
2 State v. Coal & Coke Co., 33 W. Va. i88, io S.E. 288.
1881bid, i9o.
'89Hancock v. Yaden, 121 Ind. 366, 23 N.E. 253 (1889).

191Cbi. 371.
19'Commtonwealth v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 28 N.]E.

1126

(i891).

See
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from operating "truck stores,"'192 acts providing penalties for delay
in payment of wages, 19' acts prohibiting payment in any other medium than in cash, 94 acts requiring payment of wages on the day of
discharge,' 95 acts requiring the weighing of coal at the mines, 95 and
acts requiring monthly payments of wages. 197
Few enactments of this kind were upheld during the ninties
although there were exceptions. 5 8 The Arkansas court was willing
to concede the power to regulate payment of wages by corporations
under the authority to amend charters, but the power could not be
also Kellyville Coal Co. v. Harrier, 2o7 IIl. 624, 69 N.E. 927 (1891), in which
an act was declared unconstitutional which prohibited deductions from wages
except for money, checks, and drafts as agreed, and which authorized a recovery for deductions.
192 Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. I7I, 31 N.E. 395 (1892).
193San Antonio etc. Ry. Co. v. Wilson, 4 Willson Civ. Cas. 323 (Tex.),
19 S.W. 91o (1892). The court here thought the act violated the equal protection clause. "If the legislature desires," went the opinion, "to interfere at
all in the enforcement of labor claims, it must do so by laws equal in their
operation, and protecting alike the interest of the employer and employe, for
the law knows no favorites."
' 94 State v. Loomis, II5 Mo. 307, 22 S.W. 350 (1893); State v. Wilson,
61 Kan. 32, 58 Pac. 981 (1899).
95
2 Leep v. St. L., I. Mt. & So. R. R., 58 Ark. 407, 24 S.W. 75 (1894).
The act was unconstitutional as applied to natural persons, since it was quite
harmless for private individuals to contract for the payment of wages at any
time, but valid as to corporations under the power to amend charters, Chief
Justice Bunn, dissenting, on the grounds that the act was unconstitutional as
to both
individuals and corporations.
. ' 98 In Re House Bill, No. 203, 21 Colo. 27, 39 Pac. 431 (1895). In Jones
v. People, 1Io Ili. 590 (1884), a statute was upheld which provided that a
"track scale" be furnished by operators of mines, and that all miners paid by
weight be paid on the basis of such weights. The act, as interpreted, left the
parties free to contract to compute wages in any other way they might choose.
But in Harding v. People, i6o Ill. 459, 43 N.E. 624 (I896), such provisions
were found unconstitutional because they prohibited a contract to allow each
miner, for his last car of the day, to average the weights of the others cars.
197 johnson v. Goodyear Mining Co., x27 Cal. 4, 59 Pac. 304 (899).
' 98 State v. Peel Splint Coal Co., 36 W. Va. 802, 15 S.E. 1000 (1892);
State v. Brown etc. Co., i8 R. I. i6, 25 Atl. 246 (1892); Opinion of the
justices, 163 Mass. 589, 4o N.E. 713 (1895); Commonwealth v. Dunn, 17o
Mass. 140, 49 N.E. 110 (1898) ; Woodson v. State, 69 Ark. 521, 65 S.W. 465
(1899) ; International Text-Book Co. v. Weissinger, i6o Ind. 349, 65 N.E.

521 (1899).
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But the Supreme Court of the United
extended to individuals.'
States paved the way for thoroughly establishing this phase of the
police power when in 1899 it upheld a "payment on discharge"
statute under the power of the State to amend charters0 0 and in
19O1 a Tennessee act requiring redemption in cash of store orders. 20 '
The latter decision was clearly based upon the police power of the
State to protect the public interest in the welfare of laborers, Holden
v. Hardy,20 2 being cited in support thereof. Three years later the
Ohio mechanic's lien law was upheld, 22 although the Ohio court
had, in 19oo declared unconstitutional an anti-screen law because it
was unfair to miners.

20 4

In spite of these results, there were reactionary decisions in the
twentieth century 2" but for the most part conditions showing a
genuine social and economic evil together with some evidence from
which reasonable men might think the measure applicable to the
evil have been regarded as sufficient to enable the State to regulate
such matters as payment of wages, with due process of law.2'
Old
'0 0 Leep v. St. Louis I. Mt. & So. R. R., supra. This was the basis of
the decision in State v. Brown, supra, but the Massachusetts cases, supra,
rested not only on the power to amend, but upon the police power as -well.
20
oSt. Louis, I. Mt. & So. R. R. v. Paul, 173 U. S. 404, 43 L. Ed. 746, i1
Sup. Ct. 419 (1899).
20

Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13, 46 L. Ed. 55,

22

Sup.

(19O1).

Ct. i

U. S. 366, 42 L. Ed. 78o, I8 Sup. Ct. 383 (898).
3Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 293 U. S. 532, 48 L.

202i69

20

Ed. 778,

24

Sup. Ct. 576 (i9o4).

-0 4Re Preston, 63 Ohio St. 428, 59"N.E. ioi (igoo).
20
State v. Missouri Tie & Lumber Co., I8i Mo. 536, 8o S.W. 933 (904);

Gordon v. State, 5I Tex. Cr. 531 IO3 S.W. 633 (907).

-O0Johnson Lytle & Co. v. Spartan Mills, 68 S. C. 339, 47 S.E. 695
(io4); Shortall v. Puget Sound Bridge Co., 45 Wash. 29o, 88 Pac. 212
(9o7); Keokee Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U. S. 224, 58 L. Ed. 1288, 34 Sup.
Ct. 856 (1914) ; Regan v. Tremont Lumber Co., 134 La.,i99, 63 So. 874 (914) ;
Atkins v. Grey Eagle Coal Co., 76 W. Va. 27, 84 S.E. 9o6 (915), anti-script
laws upheld. Seelyville Coal Co. v. McGlosson, 166 Ind. 561, 77 N.E. io44
(i9o6), [but see Republic Iron and Steel Co. v. State, 16o Ind. 379, 66 N.E.
loo5 (i9o3)] ; Lawrence v. Rutland R. R. Co., 80 Vt. 37o, 67 Atl. 2o9I (2907) ;
New York Central & H. R. R. Co. v. Williams, 299 N. Y. io8, 92 N.E. 404
(i9io [Cf. Erie R. R. v. Williams, 233 U. S. 685, 58 L. Ed. 155, 34 Sup. Ct.
761 (2914)]; Wynne v. Seaboard Air Line R. R. Co., 96 S. C. I, 79 S.E.
521 (1913) ; Arkansas Stave Co. v. State, 94 Ark. 27, 125 S.W. 100
(I9IO) ;
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notions of the absolute protection of liberty of contract have been
relegated to the discard, facts of an economic and social nature are
considered in arriving at conclusions, and fictions about the invasion
of the rights of the working man have been abandoned. But while
the power itself to regulate such matters is no longer the subject of
controversy, the courts have not failed to indicate that the exercise of
the power is still subject to the due process requirements. Thus an
indecent exercise thereof may still be unconstitutional. In 192o
the Michigan court could not uphold a statute, the violation of
which made the employer liable in the sum of five hundred dollars
for a failure to pay wages amounting to twelve dollars and thirtytwo cents. 20 7 It was not due process of law. The difference between
the amount of wages due and the amount to which the penalty accrued was unreasonable and exorbitant.
A similar result was reached in 1923 in Indiana respecting an
act imposing a fine for each day's delay in payment of wages after
seventy-two hours from the time of leaving the employment.2 *-

s

A

similar result was reached with regard to an act requiring semimonthly payments and providing, as did the Michigan statute, a
ten per cent penalty for each day's delay after due. 20 " Likewise in
1923 an Illinois statute requiring employers to permit all workers
to absent themselves from their labor for two hours on election days
State v. Cullon, 138 La. 395, 70 So. 338 (1915) ; State v. Missouri Pac. R. R.,
242 Mo. 339. 147 S.W. ii8 (igii) ; State v. McCarroll, 138 La. 454, 70 So.
448 (915); Moore v. Indian Spring Channel Gold Mining Co., 37 Cal. App.
370, 174 Pac. 378 (9i18); Manford v. Singh, 40 Cal. App. 700, i8i Pac. 844
(I919), acts regulating time of payment of wages from two to four times
monthly and payment on discharge acts upheld. McLean v. Arkansas, 211
U. S. 539, 53 L. Ed. 315, 29 Sup. Ct. 2o6 (19o9); Rail Coke Co. v. Ohio
Ind. Comm., 236 U. S. 338, 59 L. Ed. 607, 35 Sup. Ct. 359 (,9,5) ; anti-screen
laws or run-of-the-mine laws upheld. Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S.
225, 56 L. Ed. 175, 32 Sup. Ct. 74 (1911), act making assignments of future
wages invalid, except under certain conditions upheld. With this compare
West Jefferson Woolen Mills, 147 Tenn. 100, 245 S.W. 542 (1922),

in which

an act was upheld which provided that no action be brought to charge an
.employer upon an assignment made by an employe for wages unearned at the
time of the assignment, unless the same had been assented to by the employer.
207
Davidow v. Wadsworth Manufacturing Co., 211 Mich. 90, 178 N.W.
776

(1920).

2oState v. Martin, 193 Ind.

120, 139 N.E. 282 (1923).
0 Superior Laundry Co. v. Rose, 193 Ind. 138, 138 N.E. 761

2 9

(1923).
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without deducting therefor from their wages was invalidated because it was not due process of law 2 10 So it seems clear that while
the regulation of wage payment is certainly within the police power
of the State, liberty of contract notwithstanding, that regulation must
be decent, reasonable, calculated to remove genuine evils of a social
and economic nature, and, on the whole, of such a character as not to
materially interfere with the substantial terms of the contract as regards the amount of wages to be paid.
c. Statutes Relating to the Amount of Wages to be Paid to Laborers
The first attempts to secure regulation of the amount of wages
to be paid were made with respect to public servants. As early as
1894 the New York court upheld an act affecting the wages of public
employes. 2 1- 1

Three years later, however, it was found in Ohio that

an ordinance of the City of Cleveland fixing a minimum wage for
labor performed on city work was in conflict with the Ohio Bill of
Rights and with the Fourteenth Amendment.21 2

Although Indiana

23

the State Courts soon abandoned the grounds of
held similarly,
these decisions and statutes have generally been regarded as constitutional when minimum wages were fixed for those working for the
States, 21 4 upon analogy to hours of labor restrictions for public ser-

vants.
The next step was in the direction of minimum wages for women
and children. While acts prescribing wages for public servants
21

°People v. Chicago, Mil. & St. P. R.

,55

(1923).
2 11

Clark v. State, I42 N. Y. io,

212

36

N.E.

R. Co.,

306 Ill. 486, 138 N.E.

8,7 (2894).

Bramley v. Norton, 5 Ohio N.P. 183 (,897).
213Street v. Varney Electrical Supply Co., 16o Ind. 338, 66 N.E. 895
(io5). See also People v. Coler, 166 N. Y. 1, 59 N.E. 716 (igoi) in which
a minimum wage provision for public servants was invalidated because it
violated the rights of cities.
214

Ryan v. New York, 177 N. Y. 271, 69 N.E. 599 (39o4), as to em-

ployes hired directly by the State, distinguishing the Coler case, supra; Malette v. Spokane, 77 Wash. 205, 137 Pac. 469 (3913) ; Norris v. City of LawCampbell v. City of New York, 218
ton, 47 Okl. 213, 148 Pac. 123 (915);
App. Div. 826, 219 N. Y. S. 782 (1927), affirmed in 244 N. Y. 317,

55 N.E.

628; Morse v. Delaney, 218 App. Div. 826, 219 N. Y. S., affirmed in 355 N.E.
628 (927).
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could be justified under the power of the State to determine conditions under which work should be performed for it, acts which fixed
a minimum wage for employes in private industries must be constitutional if at all, under the police power only. In Oregon it was
found that a statute providing for the determination of a minimum
wage which should adequately supply the necessary cost to maintain
women in health was not without due process of law. 21 ' The basis
of the decision was that the act was reasonably calculated to accomplish a purpose within the police power of the State. The court was
unable to say that the law was a plain, palpable invasion of rights
secured by the fundamental law, and that it had no reasonable relation to the end sought. 21 6 The same question was disposed of in
the same way in Simpson v. O'Hara.21 7 Three years later, 1917,
these decisions were affirmed by the Supreme Court with four dissenting votes, Mr. Justice Brandeis taking no part in the decision.21
On the strength of the Federal decision, the Minnesota court
sustained a wage law for women providing for a compensation "sufficient to maintain the worker in health and supply him with the
necessary comforts and conditions of reasonable life. ' 21 9 Mr. Felix
Frankfurter, as attorney for the Consumer's League and amicus
curiae, filed a copy of his brief in Stettler v. O'Hara,giving the court
the benefit of the data and results of his extensive sociological research in connection with the Oregon statute. Arkansas sustained,
in like manner, a similar statute, 220 as did Washington - 2 and Massachusetts, 222 although the act in the latter State was not technically
compulsory, the only penalty for violation thereof being a provision
for the publication of the names of such employers as refused to
comply with the prescribed wage. The court refused to recognize
-15Stettler v. O'Hara, 69 Or. 519, 139 Pac. 743 (1914).
1 Ibid, 535.
21770 Oregon 261, 141 Pac. I58 (1914).
218Stettler v. O'Hara, 243 U. S. 629 (917).
See Powell, "The Oregon
Minimum Wage Cases," 32 Pol. S. Q. :96 (917); see also Powell, "Minimum
2 8

Wage

Legislation," 12 Minn. L. Rev. i (1917).

219

Williams v. Evans, 139 Minn. 32, 165 N. W. 495, 166 N. W. 504 (1917).
2-°State v. Crowe, 13o Ark 272, 197 S.W. 4 (1917).
22
Larsen v. Rice, IOO Wash. 642, 171 Pac. 1037 (1918); Spokane Hotel
Co. v.
Younger, 113 Wash. 359, 194 Pac. 595 (192O).
222
Holcombe v. Creamer, 231 Mass. 99, i2o N.E. 354 (1918).

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

the constitutional protection urged of the employers' "right of
privacy."
In 1923, however, the Supreme Court invalidated the minimum
wage law for the Districtof Columbia which applied to women and
children.2 23 Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking for the Court, insisted
on treating that phase of the police power which was here exercised
to equalize the economic situation between employer and employe as
exceptional, the rule being that freedom of contract forbade any legislative interference between capital and labor in their contractual
relations. From such a premise, the Justice proceeded to examine
and to classify the various exceptions which courts had allowed to
the rule, and, finding minimum wage acts different in certain respects from any of these, arrived at the conclusion that to regulate
wages for women's labor was not within the police power, and was
therefore unconstitutional.

224

The Court further objected to the act inasmuch as no definite
standard was prescribed for the guidance of the administrative board
in determining a "living wage," but it had been thought that the
presence of a definite standard in similar statutes had long ceased
to be a necessary provision.2 2 5 .Lochner v. New York, long since
regarded as obsolete in principle and result, though never expressly
overruled, was cited and relied upon. There were vigorous dissents,
of course, and the truth is that two completely different standards of
reasonableness were applied, the one objective, the other purely personal and subjective. If a weighing of interests took place, the
point of balance depended, it seems, not so much upon the interests
themselves, but upon the manner in which they were weighed.
The Adkins case has been followed by the Federal courts,226 and

223Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525
22

(1923).

4Ibid, 554. "The function of legal history comes to be one of illustrating
how rules and principles have met concrete situations in the past and of enabling us to judge how we may deal with such situations in the present, rather
than one of furnishing self sufficient premises from which rules are to be
obtained by rigid deduction." Pound, in "The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence," 25 Harm.'L. Rev. 140, 147 (911).
For criticism of
Adkins v. Children's Hospital see 23 Col. L. Rev. 565 (1923).
2 2
5See Mutual Film Co. v. Ohio Board of Censors, 236 U. S. 230, 245,
59 L.22 6Ed. 552, 35 Sup. Ct. 387 (1914).
Folding Furniture Works v. Ind. Comm. of Wis., 30o Fed. 991 (1924).
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the Kansas court,2 2- 7 the latter insisting that it was deprived by the
Supreme Court decision from exercising its own independent judgment. The power to fix minimum wages for children, of course, is
not affected by the Adkins case. 22 ' Neither, it seems, does the case
affect the power to fix minimum wages for laborers on public
works, although the Supreme Court will apparently not fail to examine closely such acts to ascertain whether a violation thereof is
sufficiently definite to support a criminal charge. 220 In the latter
2 30
case, it is without due process of law.

V.

Statutes Relating to Incidents of Collective Bargaining
Within the past score of years legislatures have recognized what
labor advocates have long insisted upon, namely that the economic
struggle between labor and capital is such an unequal one that State
control of the agencies of bargaining is necessary. As public opinion
demanded, an increasing number of labor laws have been enacted
in the several States to remedy the situation, the legislatures attacking the evil where, as they saw it, the danger was greatest, in the
attempt to place labor and capital upon an equal footing as regards
their respective bargaining powers.22 1 The theory of the police
After the decision the statute was amended to require a "reasonable" instead
of a "living" wage, with authority in the industrial commission to grant licenses for exceptions when it appeared that employers were not able to pay
the reasonable wage determined by the commission. It is significant that one
of the principle economic arguments for minimum wage laws is compromised
in such a statute, namely, the principle that a business that cannot pay a
"living" for at least a "reasonable" wage is a parisite supported at the expense of society. See also Murphy v. Sardell, 269 U. S. 530 (1925) ; Donham
v. West-Nelson Mfg. Co., 273 U. S. 657, 71 L. Ed. 400, 47 Sup. Ct. 344 (1926).
-°-Topeka Laundry Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 119 Kan. 12, 237
Pac. lO41. See also Law and Labor, 7, 252 (1925).
22SStevenson v. St. Clair, 16I Minn. 444, 2Ol N.W. 629 (1925).
220See Connally v. General Construction Co., 46 Sup. Ct. 126.
-3OCf. State v. Read Co., 33 Wyo. 387, 240 Pac. 208 (925).
-31Learned Hand points out that usuary laws present glaring examples
of interference by the legislature to equalize bargaining power between two
parties, one of whom has such an economic advantage over the other as to
justify the interposition of legislative power. "Due Process of Law," 21
Han'. L. Rev., 495, 505, n. 2. (19o8).
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power has been invoked as the legal justification for these regulations. Opposed to the police power the individualists have pitted
the standard of due process of law, as protecting the traditional
,freedom of contract.
For a half century a strict application of this standard resulted
in what has been called a fictitious equality between the laboring man
and his employer. 32 Writers and judges as well as economists have
recognized that, in fact, labor was not equal to capital in bargaining
power.2 3 3 As early as 1898 the Supreme
Hardy, 2 34 said:

Court, in Holden v.

"The legislature has also recognized the fact, which the experience of legislatures in many States have corroborated, that the
proprietors of these establishments (underground mines) and their
operators do not stand upon an equality and that their interests are,
to a certain extent, conflicting. The former naturally desire to obtain as much labor as possible from their employes, while the latter
are often induced by the fear of discharge to conform to regulations
which their judgment, fairly exercised, would pronounce to be
detrimental to their health and strength. In other words the proprietors lay down rules and the laborers are practically constrained
to obey them. In such cases self-interest is often an unsafe guide
235
and the legislature may properly interpose its authority."
That the legislature may interpose its authority, then, will scarcely be denied by reasonable men. Whether the particular instances
of interference are such that a reasonable man might deem proper,
to equalize the respective bargaining powers of the parties, are questions for the courts to decide. That labor may in general take concerted action to meet employers on an even basis is no longer denied, 236 although such has not always been true either in America
2 2

s See Dorsey Richardson, Constitutional Doctrines of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Johns Hopkins Studies in History and Political Science,
XLII, 3, 36 (1924).
233See Pound, "Liberty of Contract," i Yale L. J. 454 (199o).
234i69 U. S. 366, 42 L. Ed. 78o, iS Sup. Ct. 383.
23'Ibid, 397.
2
36See A. T. Mason, Organized Labor and the Law, 68, 69 (0925).
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or in England. 2 7

Thus in a famous dissent, 23 8 Mr. Justice Holmes

declared: "In present conditions a workman not unnaturally may
believe that only by belonging to a union can he secure a contract
that shall be fair to him ... If that belief, whether right or wrong,

may be held by a reasonable man, it seems to me that it may be enforced by law in order to establish the equality of position between
the parties in which liberty of contract begins.

239

The source of conflict has of late arisen out of the particular
kind of concerted action which labor has seen fit to take. One of
the commonest of these, of course, has been the strike. The right
of workmen to stop work en mnasse has generally been unquestioned
since Commonwealth v. Hunt,249 although prior to that case, the
doctrine of criminal conspiracy had been freely employed to render
unlawful, when done in combination, that which a single workman
might do with impunity.241 Two courses of conduct on the part of
strikers, the boycott and the system of picketing, have received
diverse treatment at the hands of the courts. The primary boycott
in some jurisdictions has been declared to be unlawful ;242 the secondary boycott has been regarded by some courts as lawful,2 4 by
others unlawful. 244

Picketing in a peaceable manner and without

violence has by the common law of most States been regarded as a
237See, A. V. Dicey, The Relation between Law and Public Opinion in
England, 98, 99 (19o5). By the Combination Act of i8oo trade unions were
unlawful.
238Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. I, 26-27, 59 L. Ed. 441, 35 Sup. Ct. 24o

(1915).

239Cf. also. C. B. & Q. R. R. v. McGuire, 2i9 U. S.549, 570, 55 L. Ed.
328, 3 Sup. Ct. 259 (911).
2404
24 1

Met. (Mass.) 11

(1842).

See Commons and Gilmore, Documentary History of American Industrial Society, 233, and early cases in F. B. Sayre's Cases on Labor Law, as
well as Eddy, The Law of Combinations,vol. I, (19oi).
24 2
See Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S.
312, 364, note 28, 66 L. Ed. 254, 42 Sup. Ct. 124 (1921).
24
3In New York. See Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582
(917).
44
2 1n Illinois, Massachusetts and Maryland. See Brandeis' dissent, supra,
364, note 28.
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legitimate means of bargaining, 45 but otherwise when accompanied
with violence. 46
Excessive action on the part of employes, which the unions
seemed unable to control, have resulted in the application of the
injunction to such an extent that in many jurisdictions, labor has
been deprived of the advantage which a more moderate indulgence
in picketing would have permitted to it. The legislature, in some
States, have at this point interposed their authority to balance the
situation, and anti-injunction statutes have given rise to some of
the most important and complex constitutional questions that modern
labor legislation has precipitated.
Before this situation arose the occasional legislative interference
had been most frequently advantageous to capital. This was not
inconsistent with the development of the common law. Employers,
at earlier stages of the law, were insistent advocates of an extensive
police power, but as legislative tactics began to change, they became,
in turn, equally blatant individualists. Economic interests gravely
affected political views. But constitutional provisions have checked
legislative action at all periods regardless of what decision general
assemblies have arrived at as to whether labor or capital had the
better of the economic argument.
City ordinances and State statutes prohibiting picketing entirely
have been upheld by the courts,2 47 on the ground that the same constituted a valid exercise of the police power. It has even been said
that the city owed the employer the duty to protect him in his busi245
In

New York; see Mills v. U. S. Printing Co., 99 App. Div. 6o5, 91
92 N.E. 214 (igio).
The same rule is followed, it seems, in Ohio, Oklahoma and Missouri. See Brandeis dissent, supra.
See also American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257
U. S. 184, 66 L. Ed. i89, 42 Sup. Ct. 72 (1921).
24
California and Illinois have held picketting, in itself, unlawful. See
Moore v. Cooks, Waiters etc. Union No. 402, 39 Cal. App. 538, 179 Pac.
417 (1919). In Atchison, Topeka and Sana Fe v. Ghee, 139 Fed. 582 (1905) it
was held that violence was unnecessary to effect an act of intimidation. See,
in general, 34 Han'. L. Rev. 88 (1920). In New York if violence is used,
all picketting may be enjoined. International Tailoring Co. v. Hillman, ERew
York Law Journal, August 13, 1925, 7 Law and Labor 238 (1925). See also
Brandeis' dissent, supra, n. 29.
247Ex parte Williams, 158 Cal. 550, III Pac. 1035 (191o); Hardie-Tynes
Manufacturing Co. v. Cruise, 189 Ala. 66 (1914) 66 So. 657.

N. Y. S. 185 and 199 N. Y. 76,
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ness by such statutes.245 While other courts have found such measures invalid, 240 as late as 1924 it was found that an ordinance of
Indianapolis which-was construed to prohibit peaceable picketing
250
was not an unreasonable exercise of the police power.
Concurrently, however, with legislation against picketing which
was probably never very prevalent, there developed a tendency to
legislate in behalf of organized labor to equalize the bargaining power
of the parties. Thus attempts were made to prevent the discharge
of employes for belonging to labor unions and to prevent contracts
involving clauses forbidding membership in such unions. The State
courts have uniformly held that such statutes were unwarranted by
the police power, and so palpably unreasonable and arbitrary that
they were not due process of law. They also deprived employers of
an attribute of property which was within constitutional protection. 25 1
The Supreme Court has likewise similarly committed itself both as
2 53
regards acts of Congress 252 and State legislatures.
2-SEx parte Stout, 82 Tex. Cr. 183, 198 S.W. 967 (97).
2
49Ex parte Sweitzer, 13 Okl. Cr. 154, i6z Pac. 1134 (1927) but not on
constitutional grounds; St. Louis v. Gloner, 210 Mo. 502, 109 S.W. 30 (1908) ;
Hall v. Johnson, 87 Or. 21, 169 Pac. 515 (9,7), although strikes as well as

picketting were prohibited.
25

Thomas v. Indianapolis, 195 Ind. 440, 145 N.E. 550 (2924).
State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163, 31 S.W. 781 (2895) ; Gillespie v. People,
I88 Ill. 176, 58 N.E. 2007; State v. Bateman, 7 Ohio N. P. 487 (90o) ; State
v. Kreutzberg, 14 Wis. 530, 9o N.W. io98 (29o2) ; Coffeyville Vitrified Brick
and Tile Co. v. Perry, 69 Kan. 297, 76 Pac. 848 (I9O4) ; Goldfield Consolidated Mines v. Goldfield Miners' Union, 159 Fed. 500 (1907); Re Berger, 33
Ohio C. C. 289 (i912) ; People v. Western Union Tel. Co., 7o Colo. 9o, 298
Pac. 246 (igai); Cf. State v. Daniels, i18 Minn. 155, 236 N.W. 584 (912);
Jackson v. Berger, 92 Ohio St. 130, io N.E. 732 (2915); Montgomery v.
Pac. Electric Ry. Co., 293 Fed. 68o (1923).
252Adair v. United States, 2o8 U. S. i6i, 52 L. Ed. 436 (i9O7).
25 3
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 59 L. Ed. 442, 35 Sup. Ct. 240 (94).
Mr. Justice Day attempted to distinguish the two cases, but Mr. Justice Holmes
denied the difference. See Powell, 33 Pol. S. Q. 396, 404 (i918).
In i9o2
the Tennessee court pronounced void an ordinance of Nashville because it required all municipal printing to bear union labels. This was a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment as it deprived those not using union labels of liberty and
of the equal protection of the laws in pursuing the avocation of the trade of
printing. Marshall and Bruce Co. v. Nashville, io9 Tenn. 495, 71 S.W. 815
(i9o3).
Cf. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Bailey, 99 Ohio St. 32, i24 N.E.
I95 (I929) where an act prohibiting corporations from compelling employer
2 2
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But although neither Congress nor legislatures have the power
to provide that membership in labor organizations shall not be sufficient grounds for discharge, it does not follow, that the public interest in the continuation of the laborer's employment will not justify
some infringement of the employer's right to hire and discharge at
his pleasure whomsoever he may choose. Massachusetts attempted
to prohibit a railroad from discharging an employe because of information as to his conduct until an opportunity was given him to
make a statement in the presence of persons furnishing the information, but it was too violent an invasion of the liberty of the employer.2 54 The reasoning was similar to that employed in the
Adair and Coppage cases. The employer might dispense with the
services of his workmen at will without accounting to anyone for the
reasons therefor. In 1921, however, the Texas court decided that
legislation making it a crime to discharge an employe because of
testimony given before the industrial welfare commission was valid,
as within the power of the legislature to make laws for the welfare
255
and betterment of the conditions of working people.
The "liberty of silence" of employers has also been protected by
the courts by the invalidation of acts requiring a service letter to
be given when the employe leaves his employment, stating therein
the reasons for the same.256 A Georgia court declared that this right
to "speak or remain silent" was the "birthright of every citizen of
Georgia 257 and in Texas it was asserted that liberty of contract was
a "natural right" which could not be taken away. 258 "Judges are
apt to be naif," and they, no less than anyone else necessarily find
that to which they are unaccustomed contrary to "natural" right.
Here to speak or remain silent was a natural right which the government could not take from the citizen; the government could not
to join any association, or from withholding wages for dues was declared un-

constitutional.
254
Opinion of the Justices,

22o Mass. 627, io8 N.E. 8o7 (I915) ; Cf. State
v. Nashville etc. Ry. Co., 124 Tenn. I, 135 S.W. 773 (1911).
255Poye
v. Texas, 89 Tex. Cr. 225, 230 S.W. 161 (1921).
2 56
Wallace v. Georgia C. & N. R. R., 94 Ga. 732 (1894) ; A. T. & S. F.
R. R. v. Brown, 8o Kan. 312 (19o9); St. Louis S. W. R. R. Co. v. Griffin,
io6 Tex. 477, 171 S.W. 703 (1914).
257
Wallace v. Georgia C. & N., supra.
25SSt. Louis etc. v. Griffin, supra.
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take away the right because it was a natural right. And so the
reasoning continued until the Supreme Court in 1922 upheld a
Missouri act as a reasonable and therefor constitutional restriction
of liberty of the employer for the purpose of protecting labor. 259 A
2 60
similar result attended the controversy over an Oklahoma act.
If the liberty to make contracts was a "property" right of the employer, so also did a workman's reputation have pecuniary value to
him. "What more reasonable," continued Mr. Justice Pitney,
"than for the legislature of Missouri to deem that the public interest required it to treat corporations as having, in a particular
degree, the reputation and well being of their former employes in
their keeping, and to convert what otherwise might be but a legal
privilege, or under prevailing custom, a 'moral duty,' into a legal
duty, by requiring, as this statute does, that when an employe is
discharged or has voluntarily left the service, it shall give him, on
his request, a letter setting forth the nature and character of his
service and its duration, and truly stating what cause, if any, led
'
him to quit such service ? 261
It is difficult to determine from this decision just whether or
not the Fourteenth Amendment imposes restrictions upon the States
as to freedom of speech or silence, as the decision rests upon the
conclusion that, even if the Constitution did so restrict the States,
the infringement of that liberty by service letter acts was not an
unreasonable one, but fairly fell within the police power. In Patterson v. Colorado2 2 the Court had side-tracked the issue of the
Amendment protecting against State interference with freedom of
speech,263 and in 1925 the Court retreated from the dictum of Mr.
Justice Pitney in the Prudential Insurance case, making for purposes of argument, the opposite assumption.20 4

It

seems clear,

however, that so far as service letters are concerned, there is no
25

Prudential Insurance Co. v. Cheek,
Sup. Ct. 516 (1922).

259 U. S. 530,

66 L. Ed.

260C. R. I. & P. R. R. v. Perry, 259 U. S. 548 (1922).
201259 U. S. 530, 546.
2 2205 U. S. 454, 5i L. Ed. 879, 27 Sup. Ct. 556 (1907).
21331bid, 462.
234Giflow v. People of New York, 268 U. S. 652, 666 (925).

1o44, 42
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constitutional impediment in the way of statutes requiring the same
to be given employes upon leaving their employment.
Anti-injunction statutes have presented another difficult issue.
In 1916 a Massachusetts act was challenged which (i) forbade the
issuance of injunctions in labor disputes except to prevent irreparable injury to property or property rights, for which there was no
adequate remedy at law; (2) declared the right to contract for
labor not to be a property right, and (3) declared the combination
to procure higher wages, less hours, etc., not unlawful, unless the
acts to be done were unlawful. The controversy here was between
two rival unions, wherein it was charged that the members of one
had been intimidated by the other. The statute upon which defendant relied was declared unconstitutional 265 and consequently
null and void. In Arizona, there was a different conclusion respecting an anti-injunction statute of that State.266 In 1921 the Arizona
case reached the Supreme Court of the United States and the State
decision was reversed by a five to four Court. It was held to be an
arbitrary interference with liberty of contract as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.

267

The Arizona act purported to legalize peaceable picketing. The
State decision rested upon the finding that there had been no violence used. It seems that in Arizona, prior to the statute, peaceable
picketing had been unlawful and the court could see no invasion of
the constitutional rights of employers in the removal of the presumption of the common law of the State that picketing of any kind
induced breaches of the peace. The reasoning of the State court's
opinion seems to be that inasmuch as there had been no violence
employed, the picketing must have been peaceable and an act making,
peaceable picketing legal and affording legal protection to the same
was not therefor unconstitutional.
The Chief Justice, however, in the majority opinion of the
Supreme Court, apparently took the view that although no violence
had been used, it did not necessarily follow that the picketing had
been "peaceable." Thus he declares:
"It was not lawful persuasion or inducing. It was not a mere
265

Bogni v. Perotti, 224 Mass. 152, 112 N.E. 853.
Truax v. Corrigan, 2o Ariz. 7, 176 Pac. 570 (918).
6
2 7Traux v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. Ed. 254, 42 Sup. Ct. 124.
26 6
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appeal to the sympathetic aid of would-be customers by a request to
withhold patronage. It was compelling every customer or would-be
customer to run the gauntlet of most uncomfortable publicity, aggressive and annoying importunity, libelous attacks and fear of injurious consequences, illegally inflicted, to his reputation and standing in the community. No wonder that a business of $50,000 was
reduced to only one-fourth of its former extent. Violence could
not have been more effective. It was moral coercion by illegal
'268
annoyance and obstruction and it was thus plainly a conspiracy.
Although the statute purported to legalize peaceable picketing it
seems that the Chief Justice treated the act, as interpreted by the
State Court, as an attempt to legalize more than the mere results
which ordinarily follow the calling of a strike, a secondary boycott
and the peaceable persuasion of picketing. Thus he says:
"It is to be observed that this is not the mere case of a peaceable secondary boycott as to the legality of which courts have differed
and States have adopted different statutory provisions. A secondary boycott of this kind is where many combine to injure one in his
business by coersing third parties against their will to cease patronizing him by threats of a similar injury. In such cases the many
have a legal right to withdraw their trade from the one, they have
a legal right to withdraw their trade from third persons and they
have the right to advise third persons of their intention to do so
when each act is considered singly. The question in such cases is
whether the moral coercion exercised over strangers to the original
controversy by steps in themselves legal becomes a legal wrong. But
here the illegality of the means used is without doubt fundamental." 6 9
A distinction was urged between the present case and the American Steel Foundries v. Tri-State Trades Council,270 in which the
clause of the Clayton Act containing a provision substantially the
same as that in the Arizona Act in controversy and worded in practically the same way, was construed to legalize the placing by striking employes, of one representative at each point of ingress and
268

1bid, 327-328.
611bid, 330.

2

270257

U. S. 184, 66 L. Bd. 189,

42 Sup. Ct. 72 (I92I).
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egress to the plant, for the purpose of persuading by lawful means
those who continued to work to join the strikers. In other words,
if "peaceable picketing" be thus construed, it is not unconstitutional
to prohibit injunctions aimed at such conduct. But the Chief
justice seems to regard this as something less than "peaceable
picketing," or the acts done in the Arizona case as something more
than "peaceable picketing." At any rate, he throws the burden of
responsibility for the decision upon the interpretation placed upon
it by the supreme court of the State. Thus by construing the acts
of the strenuous "moral coercion" of the strikers in the Truax case
as coming within the protection of the statute, the State court made
it imperative for the Federal Court to invalidate the act. The Chief
Justice also rested the decision upon the equality clause and was
able to successfully distinguish the Amnerican Steel Foundries case
on these grounds.
That Mr. Justice Holmes approached the situation from a different point of view, is forcibly indicated by his reasoning that he
could not "understand the notion that it would be unconstitutional
to authorize boycotts and the like in aid of the employes' or the
employers' interest by statute when the same result has been reached
27
constitutionally without statutes" by courts with whom he agreed. 1
The thought here seems to be that the "fundamental principles of
justice" embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be violated
by a statute embracing substantially what the common law has long
supported, often, as the "natural rights" of citizens of this country.
But even the dissenters here would probably concede that there
might be frequent situations wherein a similar process of reasoning
would lead to results by no means consistent with the Amendment.
It seems fair to say that the Chief Justice, in the majority opinion,
is abandoning the conception of "peaceable picketing" which the
Arizona act purports to legalize, and looks to the acts committed
which the State court, by its interpretation, declared to be legalized
by the statute. Statutes which protect such acts are unreasonable
and void, whether the act protected be called "peaceable picketing"
or by any other name. In other words, if acts complained of and
271257

348-349.

U. S. 343.

See also Mr. Justice Pitney, dissenting.

Ibid, 347-

DUE PROCESS OF LABOR LEGISLATION

proven in the record be peaceable picketing, any statute legalizing
the same, is inconsistent with due process of law in the constitutional sense.
If this be a fair analysis of the law in the Truax case, it follows
that the decision is not necessarily authority for the proposition that
anti-injunction statutes, protecting the secondary boycott and "peaceable picketing," as understood in many States where such methods
of collective bargaining have long been approved, are unconstitutional. It does fix the law, however, as regards statutes, interpreted
by binding courts as legalizing such acts as were present in the
Truax case. They are not due process of law.
In 1925 the Kansas court saved a statute similar to the one
invalidated in Traux v. Corrigan, by construing it to be no protection to workers who drove off patrons from the employer's business
by picketing, 27 2 and the New Jersey anti-injunction law has been
held not to protect picketing in the absence of a strike.2 7 3 In 1925
two conflicting decisions were rendered by a lower court in Illinois.2 7 4 The uncertainty of the constitutionality of such acts seems
to rest upon the State courts, and, it would seem that by following
the interpretation of the Clayton Act in the American Steel Foundries case, such acts may be upheld. Any different conclusion would
necessarily rest for its entire validity upon the theory advanced by
the Chief Justice in Traux v Corrigan that the equality clause is
something different and affords a separate protection not embodied
in due process of law. This distinction it is difficult to take seriously, however, and it seems exceedingly doubtful if it would support
a decree of unconstitutionality, no other objection to the statute being
tenable.
Another important development of the law with respect to collective bargaining, although but recently brought into dispute, seems
clearly settled for the present at least, namely the matter of compulsory arbitration by State agencies in disputes arising out of the
272Bull v. International Alliance etc., No. 414, 119 Kan. 713, 241 Pac.
459 (,925).
27
3Gevas v. Greek Western Workers' Club, (N. J.) 134 Atl. 309 (1926).
274
lnternational Tailoring Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of
America, Superior Ct., Cook Co., Ill., see 7 Law and Labor 237; Isidore
Ossey v. Retail Clerks Union, see 8 Law and Labor 5.
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relation between employer and employe. For a number of years
Australia has had in operation a system of arbitration designed to
relieve the distress and public inconvenience which follow in the
wake of strikes and lockouts. The Constitution, modeled in large
part after that of the United States, grants power to the National
Government to make provisions for the control of labor controversies which extend "beyond the limits of -any one State." In
pursuance of this power, the Court of Conciliation has been empowered with jurisdiction to settle all such labor disputes, their
award being compulsory upon both employer and employe. The
Court, in determining minimum wages, hours of labor and kindred
questions, functions in much the same way as our State commissions,
created for similar purposes. It examines closely statistics relative
to living conditions in general, in an attempt to work out a wage
basis conforming scientifically to economic and social conditions of
the particular communities affected. 7 5 Facts amassed are in part
collected and submitted by the parties to the controversy, and in
part obtained by independent research carried on by agencies of
the State.276

Strikes and lockouts are offenses if the dispute ex-

tends beyond the limits of one State, compulsory arbitration being
substituted for the force employed in industrial warfare.2 7 7 The social interest in the continuity of industrial operations and in the welfare of both employers and employes is made the basis of governmental interference in labor disputes. "Reason," says Henry B.
Higgins, in describing the system, "is to displace force; the might
of the State is to enforce peace between industrial combatants as
well as between other combatants; and all in the interest of the
public.

'278

In 192o Kansas attempted to put in operation a system of compulsory arbitration not dissimilar to the Australian schgme. The
Court of Industrial Relations was empowered to settle controversies
arising out of labor disputes, including the fixing of minimum wages
and determining the maximum hours of labor for certain kinds of
275See Higgens, "A New Province for Law and Order," 29 Harv. L. Rev.
see also Higgens, 32 Harv. L. Rev. i8p, 199-202 (1918).
See Higgens, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 13, 33 (1915).

II, 16-21;
27 6

277lbid, 14.
27
81bid, 54.
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workers, among which were those employed in packing industries.2 7 9
In upholding the act so far as the wage fixing power was concerned,
the State court, relying on Wilson v. New,2 8 0 declared:

"Compensation paid to working men for their labor is the most
fruitful cause of industrial unrest and of the conditions produced
thereby. The State is not powerless to regulate the wages to be
paid for labor in those enterprises without the continuance of which
the people must suffer." 28'
In weighing the conflicting interests involved in this controversy,
28 2
the Supreme Court arrived at a different conclusion.

Mr. Chief

Justice Taft, speaking for the Court, insisted that the business involved in the issue was not one so clothed with a public interest as
to justify State regulation of wages. Wilson v. New was distinguished on these grounds. Adkins v. Children's Hospital was
then a very recent decision, which may, in part, account for the attitude toward the Kansas act.
In 1923 the Court cut another slice out of the Kansas statute
when it declared it unconstitutional as applied to coal mines. 22 The

interest of the public, the Court thought, in preserving the continuity of the coal mining business was not great enough to justify
a denial of rights so long enjoyed as those to strike to boycott and
to picket. In these decisions whether it is the result reached by the
Kansas Court of Industrial Relations or the process of the State
in reaching that result, is not quite clear. Minimum wage enactments for private industries had been invalidated, and the prohibition of strikes was a matter which had been seldom attempted by
the States. 2

4

The variance of the results of the compulsory arbitra-

tion from the decisions of the Supreme Court and the common law
27
9See Court of Industrial Relations Act, c. 29, 1920.
See also H. W.
Humble, "The Court of Industrial Relations in Kansas," 19 Mich. L. Rev.
675 (192).
2"0243 U. S. 332, 6i L. Ed. 755, 37 Sup. Ct. 298 (1917).
28
Court of Industrial Relations v. Wolff Packing Co., Iog Kan. 629,

641, 2oI Pac. 418 (i92i).
282Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations,
67 L.Ed. 1103, 43 Sup. Ct. 630 (1922).
283
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U. S.522,

Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S.286, 68 L. Ed. 686, 44 Sup. Ct. 323 (1923).
But see Hall v. Johnson, supra.
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in the great majority of States could perhaps account for the decisions in the Wolff and the Dorchy cases.
But in 1925 all doubts as to what the Court was doing to the
Kansas act were dispelled. The statute was considered as it applied
to hours of labor regulations, a phase of the police power which was
then firmly established. But the Kansas statute was declared void
in this respect also, leaving no room for doubt but that, regardless
of the results reached, the way in which those results were accom2 5
It was dearly indicated that the
plished was unconstitutional.
was not in issue; it was the
regulation
labor
validity of hours of
2 S6
arbitration.
validity of compulsory
These decisions may be .regarded conclusive as to the constitutionality of compulsory arbitration while the public interest in the
continuity of such industries is no greater than at present. But
who can prophesy that such interest will not soon become paramount
to the interest of employers and employes to settle their own difficulties with the economic weapons available to them? There
must inevitably be conflict over industrial matters, for the interests
of those who buy and those who sell labor are in conflict. Regulation is necessary and constitutional, but how far such regulation can
be carried depends upon the application of an invariable standard
to shifting facts, after the interests involved have been carefully
weighed and evaluated. "Where there are more wills than one,
there must come collisions of will-and disputes; and even if the
directors of industry were to be elected there still would be need
' 28 7
Many intelligent
for regulation. Regulation has come to stay.
in indemocracy
that
thought
have
life
students of our economic
dustry will solve every problem; that representative internal manPacking Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 267 U. S. 552
(,925). But the Industrial Court Act is still of some effect as regards its
See 21
criminal features. See Dorchy v. Kansas, 47 Sup. Ct. 86 (1926).
Ill. L. Rev. 727 (1927) with which compare 33 Yale L. J. 196 (1923). Cf.
also Rhoden v. State, x6x Ga. 73, 129 S.E. 64o (1925) in which an act denouncing the enticing of another to leave his employment during the term
of his service was upheld.
2SIbid, 569.
285Wolff
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Higgens, "A New Province for Law and Order," 32 Harv. L. Rev.
IO5, i36 (I928).
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agement can untangle the web of complicated interests. 288 But this
assumes that there will never be minority interests in industry or that
they will be protected by majorities. It assumes that the public interest will never suffer in the compromises between captains of industry and of labor. It assumes that somehow economic equality
can be achieved by political equality in internal management.
But the law, as guardian of interests superior in significance to
those of either labor or capital, must jealously preserve, through
reasonable restrictions, those features of industrial life'which would
impair the former were industry to settle its own problems. The
question always is whether the infringements upon the interests of
industrial combatants, whether of labor or of capital, is justified
in view of the public interest affected. 289 When the process of
balancing interests resolves the proposition that compulsory arbitration is not incomprehensible to the reasonable man, as a means of
effecting industrial peace, compulsory arbitration will no longer be
contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
28

GIenn Frank, writing for McClure Newspaper Syndicate, December
advocates "democracy in industry," suggesting that "Sound industrial
management will recognize that, beneath and beyond all the conflicts between
employers and employees over wages, hours, and working conditions, the real
labor issue is the development of a representative government in industry that
29, 1926,

will be more realistic, more accurately adapted to the technical complexities
of industry, and more workable generally than the representative government

we have in politics."

Again, "industry is beginning to realize a challenge

to develop a workable democracy that takes fully into account both the
technical and human factors."
2 89
Cf. Powell, "Collective Bargaining," 33 PoL S. Q., 396, 407 (918).

